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Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and
the Resurgence of Unconscionability
SUSAN RANDALLt
INTRODUCTION
The common law traditionally rejected arbitration as a
deprivation of the jurisdiction of the courts and therefore
contrary to public policy. The enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act in 19251 signaled the United States'
acceptance of arbitration as a permitted method of dispute
resolution. The purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is "to
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements ... and to place [them] on the same footing as
other contracts. 2 Since the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating in 1983, the Federal
Arbitration Act has been read as embodying a "national
policy favoring arbitration."3 The Federal Arbitration Act
preempts all state laws which undermine arbitration.'
t Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. The author thanks
the University of Alabama Law School Foundation for generous research
support and Carol Rice Andrews, Al Brophy, and Ken Randall for helpful
discussions and comments.
1. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213 §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883-85 (codified as amended
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970)).
2. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) (quoting
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).
3. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (O'Connor & Rehnquist,
JJ., dissenting).
4. The states have generally followed the federal government's example in
permitting and even favoring arbitration, most notably through almost
universal enactment of the 1955 Uniform Arbitration Act. The Uniform
Arbitration Act has been adopted by thirty-five states. Fourteen states have
adopted substantially similar legislation, for a total of fourty-nine states. UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT, §§ 1-25 prefatory note (2000) (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on
Unif. State Laws). Alabama is the only state which has not adopted the
Uniform Arbitration Act or any variant. In August 2000, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved, nearly
unanimously, a modernized Uniform Arbitration Act. REVISED UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25 (amended 2000).
185
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
However, the Federal Arbitration Act preserves a role for
state law in arbitration through Section 2, which provides
that a written agreement to arbitrate in a contract
involving interstate commerce "shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract."5 The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted Section 2 to mean
that state law controls the issue of contract revocation.
Courts may revoke arbitration agreements, leaving the
parties free to litigate their claims, on generally applicable
state law grounds such as fraud, duress, and
unconscionability.6
This Article suggests that federal and state judges
retain some measure of the long-standing judicial hostility
toward arbitration, and that they have expanded the
doctrine of unconscionability beyond its typical uses to
revoke arbitration agreements and permit litigation of
claims by parties subject to arbitration agreements. The
article attempts in three ways to demonstrate that judges
use an arbitration-specific version of the unconscionability
doctrine to avoid the Federal Arbitration Act. First, judges
currently find arbitration agreements unconscionable at
twice the rate of nonarbitration agreements. Twenty years
ago, judges found arbitration and nonarbitration
agreements unconscionable at approximately the same rate.
This increased receptivity to claims of unconscionability
in the context of arbitration agreements suggests judicial
hostility to arbitration. Second, judges find unconscionable
specific features of arbitration agreements, such as forum
selection clauses and confidentiality requirements, which
are routinely enforced as unobjectionable in nonarbitration
agreements. Other features of arbitration agreements often
found unconscionable in the arbitration context but not
generally considered unconscionable are punitive damages
limitations and cost-splitting provisions. This differential
application of the doctrine of unconscionability in
comparable arbitration and nonarbitration contexts further
evidences judicial hostility to arbitration. Third, the
statements of a few outspoken judges provide direct
evidence that at least some judges dislike arbitration and
lend support to the broader conclusions drawn from the
5. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
6. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996).
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increased numbers of cases involving the unconscionability
doctrine and comparative case analysis.
Section I briefly describes the doctrine of
unconscionability and examines United States Supreme
Court precedent dealing with contract defenses,
particularly unconscionability, under the Federal
Arbitration Act. Section II analyzes the number of
unconscionability claims in 1982-1983 and 2002-2003 in
both arbitration and nonarbitration agreements and the
rates of unconscionability findings. In 2002-2003, most of
the claims of unconscionability involved arbitration
agreements, and courts were much more likely to hold
arbitration agreements unconscionable than nonarbitration
agreements. Twenty years earlier, very few claims of
unconscionability involved arbitration agreements and
courts were no more likely to find arbitration agreements
unconscionable than nonarbitration agreements. Section III
examines case law dealing with unconscionability in the
arbitration context and compares it to case law in
nonarbitration contexts. Contract features which are
unobjectionable in nonarbitration agreements ground a
finding of unconscionability in arbitration agreements.
Section IV describes various judicial statements which
explicitly illustrate judicial animosity towards arbitration.
There may be many possible reasons for judicial
expansions of unconscionability at the expense of
arbitration, including self-interested protection of thejudicial function. However, the negative judicial reactions to
arbitration and the significant expansion of
unconscionability to avoid arbitration by many judges
nationwide suggests that arbitration does in fact create
serious problems for potential claimants.7 It may be
7. The extensive secondary literature addresses these problems in detail.
See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in
Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Reginald
Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Right "Waived" and Lost in the
Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381 (1996); Mark E. Budnitz,
Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A
Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267
(1995); Richard B. Cappalli, Arbitration of Consumer Claims: The Sad Case of
Two-Time Victim Terry Johnson or Where Have You Gone Learned Hand?, 10
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 366 (2001); Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration
Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695 (2001); Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory
Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 289 (2002)
(stating that Congress did not originally intend "the FAA to enable stronger
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reasonable for courts to continue to expand
unconscionability to address these problems, despite
preemption concerns under the Federal Arbitration Act; the
malleability of the doctrine of unconscionability is
acknowledged as one of its chief virtues. The Supreme
Court has foreclosed more direct state law solutions to the
problems posed by arbitration with its recent extensions of
the Federal Arbitration Act. Since 1983, with the Supreme
Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating,' the Federal
Arbitration Act has been held to apply in state as well as
federal court. Four Supreme Court justices have criticized
this aspect of Southland, based on their reading of the
Federal Arbitration Act's legislative history: Justice
O'Connor and then-Justice Rehnquist in a dissent to
Southland, and Justices Scalia and Thomas in a dissent to
Allied-Bruce Terminix,9 which reaffirmed Southland in
parties to force weaker parties into binding arbitration"); Margaret M. Harding,
The Redefinition of Arbitration by Those with Superior Bargaining Power, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 857 (1999); Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The
Supreme Court's Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a
Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 829 (2002) (noting that drafters and
supporters of FAA envisioned that "the FAA should apply only to arbitration
agreements between merchants who have freely entered into such agreements,
and that the FAA does not apply to adhesion arbitration agreements between
powerful sellers and weak buyers"); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print
to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wisc. L REV. 33 (1997); Jean R. Sternlight, As
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action
Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory
Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury
Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 669 (2001); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 647 (1996) ("Most commentators have
concluded that the FAA was envisioned as applying to consensual transactions
between two merchants of roughly equal bargaining power, and not necessarily
to transactions between a large merchant and a much weaker and less
knowledgeable consumer."); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality
of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment
of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV.
1 (1997); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999).
8. 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1983) (O'Connor & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
9. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1983) (O'Connor & Rehnquist,
JJ., dissenting), reaffd by Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265, 285 (1995) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated in
her concurrence in Allied-Bruce, "I continue to believe that Congress never
intended the Federal Arbitration Act to apply in state courts, and that this
Court has strayed far afield in giving the Act so broad a compass," 513 U.S. at
2004] ARBITRATION AND UNCONSCIONABILITY 189
1995. Twenty state attorneys general argued unsuccessfully
to overturn Southland based on legislative history and
public policy and to return control over arbitration to the
individual states. 1° The Supreme Court has also extended
the Federal Arbitration Act to statutory claims, overruling
earlier precedent.1 Finally, the Federal Arbitration Act
applies to the full extent of the commerce power, precluding
efforts by some state supreme courts to limit its
application. 2 Judicial, political, and academic opposition to
arbitration in some of its forms" suggests that some
controls are needed. Absent Supreme Court reconsideration
of its extensions of the Federal Arbitration Act, application
of unconscionability doctrine may be one of the judiciary's
only remaining tools for protection of individuals and small
businesses. Section V provides some suggestions for
restrained use of the doctrine to avoid potential preemption
issues.
I. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Unconscionability has roots in law and equity. The
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") provision on
283, but stopped short of overruling based on special considerations of stare
decisis in statutory interpretation. Id. at 283-84.
10. Id. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissent).
11. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 485 (1989), rev'g Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)(ruling that Securities
Act of 1933 prohibits waiver of a judicial remedy through predispute agreement
to arbitrate). See also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79
(2000) (Truth in Lending Act); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 26-27 (1991) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985 ) (federal
antitrust laws).
12. See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (interpreting the language in
the Federal Arbitration Act § 2, "involving commerce" to be read broadly).
Allied-Bruce distinguished Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S.
198, 200-01 (1956), which held that evidence failed to show that an employment
contract made in New York between New York residents but performable in
Vermont evidenced a transaction involving interstate or foreign commerce as
required by Federal Arbitration Act § 2. The Alabama Supreme Court in
particular had attempted to limit the reach of arbitration clauses through
narrow interpretation of the language "involving commerce" in the Federal
Arbitration Act. See Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co., 775
So.2d 759 (Ala. 2000). Citizens Bank has ended that effort.
13. Particularly as applied to consumers, employees, and small businesses
in their dealings with more powerful corporate entities.
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unconscionability, Section 2-302, has been central to the
development of the modern law of unconscionability.
However, even prior to the adoption of Section 2-302, courts
occasionally refused to enforce unconscionable contracts.14
An often-quoted decision states that an unconscionable
agreement is one "such as no man in his senses and not
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no
honest and fair man would accept on the other."5 The term
"unconscionability" is not defined specifically in either the
case law or in the UCC. Section 2-302 states simply that a
court may refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or
clause, or may limit an unconscionable clause to avoid an
unconscionable result. 6 The Official Comment to the section
elaborates on the concept by setting out a "basic test" for
unconscionability:
[Whether, in the light of the general commercial background and
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract.... The principle is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise."
14. Perhaps the most significant cases dealing with the doctrine of
unconscionability were decided before the UCC was enacted. See Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (refusing to
enforce agreement under which seller retained security interest in various
chattels bought on deferred payment plans and sought replevin on all chattels
following late payment on one; the UCC had been adopted but was not yet in
effect); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (denying specific
performance of adhesion contract requiring farmer to sell crop at $23-30/ton,
based on market price at time of delivery, when market price rose to $90/ton);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (noting a disclaimer
of warranty for personal injuries resulting from failure of steering mechanism
unconscionable; citing UCC § 2-302 although it was not in effect in jurisdiction).
15. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750). One of
the earliest quotations of this definition appears in Hume v. United States, 132
U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (agreeing to pay $1200 per ton for materials worth $35 per
ton is unconscionable and unenforceable).
16. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1989) reads:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
17. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. official (1989).
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Courts generally recognize two types of
unconscionability, procedural and substantive, 8 and may
require the presence of both in order to find a particular
agreement unconscionable." Procedural unconscionability
refers to the making of an agreement, and substantive
unconscionability refers to its terms. In assessing
procedural unconscionability, courts consider the
experience, intelligence, and education of the parties, their
relative bargaining power, the presence or absence of
meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party, the
conspicuousness and clarity of the contract terms, and other
factors. Indicia of substantive unconscionability include
harsh, one-sided or oppressive terms; for example, a grossly
excessive price may be found unconscionable. ° Over time,
courts have applied the doctrine to transactions outside of
Article 2 of the UCC2' and a common law doctrine of
unconscionability has developed. Section 2-302 and related
issues have generated a huge volume of commentary,22
while the case law has been sparse. Section 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act permits assertion of generally
applicable contract defenses, including unconscionability,
against arbitration agreements. 24 However, any special
18. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The comment to UCC § 2-302
suggests this division, with "prevention of oppression" referring to substantive
unconscionability and "prevention of... unfair surprise" referring to procedural
unconscionability.
19. The UCC does not require both. Most cases involve elements of both
substantive and procedural unconscionability.
20. See, e.g., Hume, 132 U.S. at 414.
21. Including, for example, prenuptial and divorce agreements.
22. See, e.g., Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why
Unconscionability Has Become a Relic, 105 COM. L.J. 287 (2000); Richard
Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related
Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some
Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1981); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-
The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Eric A. Posner,
Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Docrine,
Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 283 (1995); John A. Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117
U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969); Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary: UCC
Article 2 and the Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M. L. REV. 359 (2001).
23. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
24. Section 2 provides that a written agreement to arbitrate in a contract
involving interstate commerce "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
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rules regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements
are unlawful, as contrary to the language of the Federal
Arbitration Act and Congressional intent. Because the
doctrine of unconscionability is purposefully open-ended
and its parameters undefined,25 it is particularly susceptible
to expansions superficially within the scope of Section 2.
The nature of unconscionability allows simple
circumvention of the Federal Arbitration Act, permitting
parties to an arbitration agreement to litigate their claims
through judicial application of arbitration-specific
principles of unconscionability.
The leading case dealing with unconscionability in the
context of arbitration agreements is Doctor's Associates, Inc.
v. Casarotto.26 In the initial decision,27 the Montana
Supreme Court invalidated an arbitration agreement which
violated a Montana statute requiring a first-page, special
type-face notice of the presence of an arbitration agreement
in a contract.28 The United States Supreme Court ruled that
the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the Montana
statute. Courts may apply contract defenses to invalidate
arbitration agreements under Section 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act. If, however, courts apply the common law
doctrine of unconscionability differently in the context of
arbitration than in other contexts, preemption issues under
the Federal Arbitration Act arise. In the Supreme Court's
words:
[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if
that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity,
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law
principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a
contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this
requirement of § 2.... A court may not, then, in assessing the
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). See, e.g.,Wilmot v. McNabb, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1203
(N.D. Cal. 2003).
25. Commentators have long noted the undefined character of the doctrine.
See supra note 22.
26. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). Doctor's Associates built on the earlier decisions of
Southland, Perry, and Allied-Bruce Terminix.
27. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931 (1994), rev'd, 517 U.S. 681
(1996).
28. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4), which provided: "Notice that a contract
is subject to arbitration pursuant to this chapter shall be typed in underlined
capital letters on the first page of the contract; and unless such notice is
displayed thereon, the contract may not be subject to arbitration."
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rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe
that agreement in a manner different from that in which it
otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state law.
Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would
be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what29
we hold today the state legislature cannot.
Counsel for Casarotto offered an alternative view of the
Montana court's decision at oral argument. Counsel argued
that the Montana court could have invalidated the
arbitration agreement under general principles of informed
consent, holding independent of the statute that unexpected
provisions in adhesion contracts were enforceable only if
conspicuous. Since the Montana Supreme Court did not rely
on such a general principle, the United States Supreme
Court rejected this argument. °
If the Montana Supreme Court had in fact relied on
general principles of Montana contract law, holding the
arbitration agreement unconscionable because it was
inconspicuous, did not provide adequate notice of its
contents, and ran counter to the reasonable expectations of
average consumers, what would have been the result in the
United States Supreme Court? Case law makes it clear that
a court may not apply unconscionability doctrine differently
for arbitration agreements than for other agreements.
Assuming, however, that Montana common law identified
as general indicia of unconscionability the features of the
arbitration agreement in Doctor's Associates, Montana
courts could have invalidated the agreement under Section
2. The Federal Arbitration Act would not have preempted
the general law of unconscionability in Montana as applied
to an arbitration agreement in the same way it would apply
to any contract. Even if Montana courts had only
articulated general principles of unconscionability,
presumably they could have invalidated the agreement.
29. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (emphasis in original).
30. See 517 U.S. 687-88 n.3.
31. For a different answer to this question, see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration
and Unconscionability after Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1016 (1996). Professor Ware reasons that because the
FAA does not distinguish between common law and statutory law, "Justice
Trieweiler could not have avoided FAA preemption by labeling the reasoning he
used in Doctor's Associates 'unconscionability,' instead of 'Montana Code section
27-5- 114(4).'"
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Unconscionability is an open-ended, undefined concept
subject to judicial definition case-by-case. Judges in
Montana and elsewhere have the power to hold, as a matter
of common law, that a particular agreement is one-sided,
oppressive, and unfair (in a word, unconscionable) and thus
the power to circumvent the Federal Arbitration Act. What
they may not say, under the Federal Arbitration Act, is that
the agreement is one-sided, oppressive, and unfair simply
because it is an arbitration agreement. But that limitation
is minimal and easily skirted. As the next sections attempt
to demonstrate, judges are in fact circumventing the
Federal Arbitration Act and permitting litigation by parties
to arbitration agreements through expansive, arbitration-
specific uses of unconscionability.
II. THE RESURGENCE IN UNCONSCIONABILITY
Litigants rarely invoked unconscionability prior to the
increase in the use of arbitration agreements. The
conventional wisdom was that unconscionability claims
fail.32 However, as the use of arbitration agreements has
increased, claims of unconscionability have also increased
and those claims have been surprisingly successful. A
systematic examination33 shows that in 2002-2003, litigants
raised issues of unconscionability in 235 cases, and courts
found contracts or clauses34 to be unconscionable in 100 of
those cases, or 42.5%. Of those 235 cases, 161, or 68.5%,
involved arbitration agreements. Significantly, courts were
much more likely to find arbitration agreements, as
opposed to other sorts of contracts, unconscionable. Courts
found 50.3% of the arbitration agreements unconscionable,
as opposed to 25.6% of other types of contracts. Although
federal and state courts in California decided a significant
32. See Joseph M. Perillo, Avoidance and Reformation, in 7 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 29.4 ("Most claims of unconscionability fail.").
33. Computer searches yielded the cases. I included only cases in which one
of the parties asserted that an agreement was unconscionable and in which the
court actually addressed and decided the issue. I excluded criminal cases which
dealt primarily with various types of plea and proffer agreements. I also
excluded agreements related to family and marital issues: prenuptial, divorce,
custody, and child support agreements, and the like.
34. In most of the cases, courts invalidated the entire agreement, permitting
litigation of the claim. In a few of the cases, courts severed an unconscionable
provision and enforced the remainder of the arbitration agreement. This latter
category is included in the count of judicial findings of unconscionability.
194 [Vol. 52
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number of these cases, a total of seventeen state courts
35
and fifteen federal courts36 found provisions in arbitration
agreements unconscionable.
35. Alabama, see, e.g., Anderson v. Ashby, No. 1011740, 2003 WL 21125998
(Ala. May 16, 2003); Harold Allen's Mobile Home Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Butler,
825 So.2d 779 (Ala. 2002); Ex Parte Thicklin, 824 So.2d 723 (Ala. 2002);
California, Wilson v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., Inc., No. D039355m 2003 WL
21398324 (Cal. Ct. App. June 18, 2003); Florida, Romano ex rel. Romano v.
Manor Care, Inc., 861 So.2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Idaho, Murphy v.
Mid-West Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of Tenn., 78 P.3d 766 (Idaho 2003); Kentucky,
Wilder v. Absorption Corp., 107 S.W.3d 181 (Ky. 2003); Louisiana, Posadas v.
Pool Depot, Inc., 2002-1819 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/27/03), 858 So.2d 611, writ denied,
2003-2125 (La. 11/7/03), 857 So.2d 502; Simpson v. Grimes, 2002-0869 (La. App.
3 Cir. 5/21/03), 849 So.2d 740, writ denied, 2003-2497 (La. 12/19/03), 861 So.2d
567; Massachusetts, Buhrer v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 551 (Ma.
Super. 2003); Mississippi, E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, No. 2000-IA-01527-SCT (Miss.
2002), 826 So.2d 709, affd, 537 U.S. 1194 (2003); Missouri, Swain v. Auto
Servs., Inc. No. ED82788, 2003 WL 22890022 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2003); New
Mexico, Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003-NMSC-011, 68 P.3d 901
(N.M. 2003) Nevada, Burch v. 2nd Jud. Dist. Ct. of State ex rel., County of
Washoe, 49 P.3d 647 (Nev. 2002); Ohio, O'Donoghue v. Symthe, Cramer Co.,
No. 80453, 2002 WL 1454074 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 2003); Pennsylvania, Lytle
v. Citi Fin. Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); Carll v. Terminix
Int'l Co., 793 A.2d. 921 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); Tennessee, Howell v. NHC
Healthcare-Fort Sanders, Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Texas, In
re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., No. 01-02-00370-CV, 2003 WL 23096490 (Tx. App.
2003); Washington, Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594 (Wash.
App. Ct. 2002); and West Virginia, Toppings v. Meritech Mortgage Servs. Inc.,
569 S.E.2d 149 (W.Va. 2002); State ex rel Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265
(W.Va. 2002), affd, 537 U.S. 1087 (2002).
36. The Third Circuit, applying Virgin Islands law, Alexander v. Anthony
Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256 (3rd Cir. 2003); the Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland
law, Murray v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 289 F.3d 297
(4th Cir. 2002); the Ninth Circuit, applying California law, see, e.g., Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003), affd, No. 03-605, 2004 WL
110852 (2004); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003),
No. 03-604, 2004 WL 110851 (2004); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.
2003), affd, 124 S.Ct. 53 (2003); Hawai'i law, Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-
Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003), affd, 124 S.Ct. 980
(2004); and Montana law, Domingo v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 70 Fed. Appx.
919 (9th Cir. 2003); and district courts in Arkansas, Casteel" v. Clear Channel
Broad., Inc., 254 F.Supp. 2d 1081 (W.D. Ark. 2003) California, Comb v. Paypal,
Inc. 218 F.Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Acorn v. Household Int'l, Inc. 211
F.Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Illinois, Plattner v. Edge Solutions, Inc., No.
03C2646, 2003 WL 22859532 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2003); Iowa, Faber v. Menard,
Inc., 267 F.Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Michigan, DeOrnellas v. Aspen
Square Mgmt., Inc., No. 03-10147, 2003 WL 22966021 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 4, 2003);
Minnesota, Gooden v. Vill. Green Mgmt. Co., No. Civ. 02-835 (JRT/SRN), 2002
WL 31557689 (D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2002); New York, Brennan v. Bally Total
Fitness, 198 F.Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Ohio, Garrett v. Hooters-Toledo,
No. 3:03CV7053 2003 WL 22989049 (N.D. Ohio Nov 24, 2003); Hagedorn v.
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For purposes of comparison, twenty years ago"7 there
were fifty-four cases in which the court was called upon to
decide a question of unconscionability. In nine of those, or
16.7%, the court found the contract unconscionable. Eight of
the fifty-four decisions, or 14.8%, involved arbitration
agreements; one of the eight arbitration agreements was
found to be unconscionable. The rate of unconscionability
findings by type of contract, arbitration or nonarbitration,
showed little variation. Courts held 12.5% of the arbitration
agreements, as compared to 15.2% of other types of
contracts, unconscionable. Thus, twenty years ago, courts
were slightly less likely to find arbitration agreements
unconscionable than nonarbitration agreements; in 2002-
2003, courts found arbitration agreements unconscionable
twice as frequently as other types of contracts.
These increases raise preemption issues under the
Federal Arbitration Act. Courts may not use
unconscionability differently in arbitration than in
nonarbitration contexts. Judicial application of arbitration-
specific contract defenses to arbitration agreements violates
the Federal Arbitration Act. According to the Supreme
Court, "state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is
applicable [to arbitration agreements] if that law arose to
govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally."3 8 Various factors may
account in some part for the increases in findings of
unconscionability, including increases in numbers of cases
generally and an escalating aggressiveness in the drafting
of arbitration agreements. However, increased judicial
willingness to find unconscionability in arbitration
agreements suggests a latent judicial hostility to
arbitration and use of unconscionability contrary to the
Federal Arbitration Act's mandate: an arbitration
agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
Veritas Softward Corp., 250 F.Supp. 2d 857 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Oregon, Torrance
v. Aames Funding Corp, 242 F.Supp. 2d 862 (D. Or. 2002); Tennessee, Walker v.
Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 289 F.Supp. 2d 916 (M.D. Tenn. 2003);
Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F.Supp. 2d 771 (M.D. Tenn. 2002); Washington,
Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F.Supp. 2d 1166 (W.D. Wash. 2002); and
the Virgin Islands, Plaskett v. Bechtel Int'l, Inc., 243 F.Supp. 2d 334 (D.V.I.
2003); Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, 243 F.Supp. 2d 346 (D.V.I. 2003).
37. 1982 and 1983.
38. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
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revocation of any contract."39  As the next section
demonstrates, courts uphold the same contract provisions
in nonarbitration contracts that they find unconscionable in
arbitration agreements. The next section turns to an
examination of various grounds on which courts have found
arbitration agreements unconscionable, ' °  and assesses
39. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
40. When a court finds an arbitration agreement unconscionable, it of course
refuses to enforce it. Where only a portion of that agreement is unconscionable,
the court has a choice to sever the offending provision or find the entire
agreement unenforceable. Where there are multiple unconscionable provisions,
courts generally declare the entire agreement unenforceable. A growing number
of courts recognize that severance of an unconscionable provision presents
potential opportunities for abuse. See, e.g., Clary v. Stanley Works, No. 03-1168-
JTM, 2003 WL 21728865 (D. Kan. July 24, 2003); Bailey v. Ameriquest
Mortgage Co., No. CIV. 01-545(JRTFLN) 2002 WL 100391 (D. Minn. Jan. 23,
2002). A court's severance of an offending provision may encourage parties with
superior bargaining power to include questionable or unlawful provisions in
their arbitration agreements, with the purpose of deterring potential claims.
For example, defendants have often attempted to circumvent rules invalidating
arbitration agreements which impose prohibitive costs on a claimant by offering
to pay all costs. Many courts reject such attempts with the aim of protecting
claimants generally. See, e.g., Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int'l, 324 F.3d 212, 217-
218 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 673 n.15
(6th Cir. 2003); Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F.Supp. 2d 771, 781-82 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002); In re Managed Care Litig., 132 F.Supp. 2d 989, 1001 (S.D. Fla.
2000); O'Hare v. Mun. Resource Consultants, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 126 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003) ("No existing rule of contract law permits a party to resuscitate a
legally defective contract merely by offering to change it."); West Virginia ex rel.
Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002); Flyer Printing Co. v. Hill, 805
So. 2d 829, 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Some courts have failed to recognize
the potential problems with permitting an after-the-fact offer to pay and have
permitted defendants to cure problematic arbitration agreements with such
offers. See Murphy v. AmSouth Bank, 269 F.Supp. 2d 749, 752 (S.D. Miss. 2003)
("Plaintiffs' objection that the potential costs of arbitration render, or may
render enforcement of the agreement unconscionable is rendered moot by
AmSouth's stipulation that it will bear the cost of arbitration"); Brown v.
Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, 267 F.Supp. 2d 61 (D.D.C. 2003) (if defendant agrees
to waive presumably prohibitive cost provisions of arbitration agreement,
agreement enforceable); Large v. Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp., 292 F.3d 49, 56-57
(1st Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiffs' challenge to the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement based on provision requiring them to pay costs not viable
because defendant's offer to pay costs of arbitration mooted the issue); Nelson v.
InsignafESG, Inc., 215 F.Supp. 2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating that employer's
offer to pay arbitration fees cured any potential inability of employee to
vindicate statutory claims as a result of financial situation); Arellano v.
Household Fin. Corp. III, No. 01 C 2433, 2002 WL 221604 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13,
2002) (demonstrating that court permitted mortgagor's agreement to pay costs
after-the-fact); Ex parte Celtic Life Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 766, 768 (Ala. 2002)
(demonstrating that a party to a contract can waive a provision beneficial to
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substantive Federal Arbitration Act preemption issues with
respect to each.
III. UNCONSCIONABILITY IN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The analysis in Section II demonstrates that judges
have used unconscionability with increasing frequency in
recent years and are much more likely to hold arbitration
agreements, as compared to nonarbitration agreements,
unconscionable. An examination of the application of
unconscionability to similar issues in arbitration and
nonarbitration contexts supports the conclusion that judges
are avoiding arbitration through arbitration-specific
expansions of the doctrine of unconscionability.
A. Excessive Costs Which Limit One Party's Access to
Arbitration
Various courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have held that excessive arbitration costs4 1 which
limit a party's access to an arbitral forum may render an
itself; in this instance, provision in arbitration agreement prohibiting punitive
damages held in other Alabama cases to render agreement unenforceable).
Courts which permit such strategies encourage and perpetuate bad behavior.
Fundamental fairness requires that courts reviewing the ability of plaintiffs to
pay arbitration costs should not consider these offers where the arbitration
agreement provides that the plaintiff is liable, or potentially liable, for
arbitration fees and costs. Excessively burdensome cost-splitting or "loser pays"
provisions in arbitration agreements deter all potential litigants from bringing
claims in arbitration. Courts should refuse to require arbitration in such cases,
regardless of whether a defendant agrees to pay a particular claimant's share of
fees and costs. Judicially-sanctioned "curing" of such provisions encourages
overreaching by the drafters with adverse consequences for weaker parties
generally.
41. Such costs may include filing fees, fees for the use of a facility in which
to hold the hearing, arbitrator's fees, which the parties to the arbitration often
split, or costs imposed under "loser-pays" provisions, which require the losing
party to pay various fees and costs in full. Many of the issues related to
arbitration costs will become less pervasive as a result of procedures adopted by
arbitration service providers which prevent excessive fees from precluding
vindication of rights. See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, National
Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, http://www.adr.org/
index2.1.jsp?JSPssid= 15747&JSPsrc=upload \ LIVESITE \ RulesProcedures \ N
ationalInternational \ .. \.. \ focusArea \ employment\ AAA12 lcurrent.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2004); JAMS, JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules &
Procedures, http://www.j amsadr.com/employment-arbitrationRules-2003.asp
(last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
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arbitration agreement invalid, affording the party access to
court. These cases demonstrate hostility to arbitration, even
at the Supreme Court level. In virtually all civil cases, a
prospective litigant's inability to afford litigation is
irrelevant; no accommodations are made to ensure that a
mechanism is available to resolve the dispute. A
comparison of the case law regarding prohibitive
arbitration costs, which may afford court access, and
prohibitive court costs, for which there is no relief,
illustrates the point.
1. Green Tree and Individualized Assessments of Access
to Arbitration. The United States Supreme Court has held
that excessive arbitration costs that limit one party's access
to an arbitral forum may render an arbitration agreement
invalid. In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph,42
Randolph argued that her agreement to arbitrate was
unenforceable because it said nothing about the costs of
arbitration, and thus failed to protect her from potentially
prohibitive costs of pursuing her federal statutory claims.
The Court acknowledged that substantial arbitration costs
could preclude a litigant from vindicating federal statutory
rights in the arbitral forum. However, Randolph had not
presented evidence demonstrating that she would in fact
bear such costs if she were required to arbitrate, and the
Court declined to hold the agreement unenforceable."
The Supreme Court did not determine "[h]ow detailed
the showing of prohibitive expense must be before the party
seeking arbitration must come forward with contrary
42. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
43. See id. at 90.
44. Randolph alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15
U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., by failing to disclose as a finance charge the Vendor's
Single Interest insurance requirement, and of the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f, by requiring her to arbitrate her statutory causes
of action. See id. at 83.
45. Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter and Breyer dissented from that
holding, and would have remanded to the Eleventh Circuit for further
consideration of the financial accessibility of the arbitral forum. These justices
also suggested that the majority's allocation of the burden of proof on this issue
was incorrect. Given Green Tree's superior information about the cost to
consumers of pursuing arbitration and the fairness of assigning the burden of
proof to the party with special knowledge, the dissenters stated, "it is hardly
clear that Randolph should bear the burden of demonstrating up front the
arbitral forum's inaccessibility." Id. at 96.
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evidence."46 The federal courts have generally adopted a
case-by-case determination, focusing on the claimant's
ability to pay, the difference between costs of litigation and
arbitration, and the likelihood that the cost of arbitration
will deter the bringing of claims.47 The burden of proof is on
46. Id. at 92.
47. See Spinetti v. Service Corp. Int'l, 324 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003); Musnick
v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003)
(stating that the "overwhelming consensus" among Circuits is that cost-splitting
or "loser pays" provisions of arbitration agreements are not a denial of federal
statutory rights; arbitration agreement is not unenforceable merely because the
party seeking to vindicate federal statutory rights may have to pay some costs);
Thompson v. Irwin Home Equity Corp., 300 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 2002); Blair v.
Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 610 (3d Cir. 2002) (demonstrating how the
court followed the reasoning of Green Tree and required showing of prohibitive
arbitration expenses by party opposing arbitration; mere existence of fee-
splitting provision does not render arbitration agreement unenforceable);
Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 471 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002); Bess v.
Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the
Eleventh Circuit's prior adherence to the per se invalidation rule was no longer
good law in light of the Supreme Court's reversal of its decision in Green Tree);
LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 246 F.3d 702, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (affirming
arbitration award to be paid by employee after employee failed to demonstrate
"that the assessment against her [ran] afoul" of public policy); Bradford v.
Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 553-57 (4th Cir. 2001)
(explaining the case-by-case inquiry into financial circumstances of party
opposing arbitration required under Green Tree); Burden v. Check into Cash of
Kentucky, LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that a party resisting
arbitration must demonstrate prohibitive expenses; case-by-case analysis
required); Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 683 n.9 (8th Cir.
2001) (reading Green Tree to require case-by-case analysis with plaintiff bearing
the burden of proof that arbitration expenses are likely to be prohibitive);
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st
Cir. 1999) (refusing to invalidate arbitration agreement even where plaintiff
may be charged "tens of thousands of dollars per case" because claimant's
argument too speculative; also observing that "arbitration is often far more
affordable to plaintiffs and defendants alike" than litigation); Williams v. Cigna
Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 764 (5th Cir. 1999) (adopting case-by-case
analysis to determine whether claimant can effectively vindicate statutory
rights; also holding that a fee-splitting provision did not invalidate the
arbitration agreement because the plaintiff had not shown that the arbitration
fees required were prohibitive to his ability to vindicate his statutory claims);
Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., 167 F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 1999) (following
Rosenberg); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding that an arbitration agreement was invalid because the
plaintiffs total estimated arbitration costs of between $1,875-$5,000 were
prohibitively high); In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F.Supp.
2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Raasch v. NCR Corp., 254 F.Supp. 2d 847 (S.D. Ohio
2003) (explaining that per se invalidation of an arbitration agreement based on
fee-splitting provision contradicts Supreme Court's holding in Green Tree, that
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the party resisting arbitration.48 State courts have endorsed
similar tests 9 Others have refused generally to invalidate
arbitration agreements on grounds of cost."
The Green Tree approach evidences some remnants of
judicial hostility toward arbitration on the part of the
United States Supreme Court. If Randolph's complaint was
that her financial situation prevented her from paying court
costs, the Court's current precedents would certainly not
afford her a remedy. The Supreme Court has recognized
only an extremely narrow category of civil cases in which
the state must provide access to its judicial processes
without regard to a party's ability to pay court fees. In cases
in which fundamental rights are involved, and where
protection of those fundamental rights may occur only
through the judicial process, the Supreme Court has held
access to courts without payment of fees constitutionally
required. 1 In other cases, there is no right of free access to
party resisting arbitration bears burden of proving the likelihood of incurring
prohibitive costs); Lloyd v. Hovensa LLC., 243 F.Supp. 2d 346 (D.C.V.I. 2003)
("[F]ee-splitting provision in an agreement does not, in and of itself, deny a
plaintiff an opportunity to vindicate his or her statutory rights ...plaintiff
must show that the costs of the arbitral forum are prohibitive."); Nelson v.
Insignia/Esg, Inc., 215 F.Supp. 2d 143, 157-58 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Stewart v. Paul,
Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP, 201 F.Supp. 2d 291, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Goodman v. ESPE America, Inc., No. 00-CV-862, 2001 WL 64749, at *3-5
(E.D.Pa. Jan. 19, 2001) (rejecting a per se rule that fee-splitting is
unenforceable; also holding that the "loser pays" provision does not invalidate
arbitration agreement in absense of particularized showing that provision
would preclude plaintiff from seeking to vindicate rights); Arakawa v. Japan
Network Group, 56 F.Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that the agreement
to arbitrate Title VII claims is not unenforceable as a matter of law simply
because the plaintiff faces the possibility of being charged arbitration fees; also
arguing that a fee splitting arrangement is contrary to the remedial and
deterrent aims of Title VII only if the fees are so great and plaintiffs financial
situation is such that fees would substantially deter plaintiff from seeking to
enforce statutory rights).
48. See cases cited supra note 47.
49. See, e.g., Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Gatlin, 848 So. 2d 828, 849 (Miss.
2003) (requiring analysis of claimant's financial circumstances and using a
"shock the judicial conscience" test).
50. See, e.g., Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 72 P.3d 877, 885 (Idaho
2003) ("We have never previously held that the prohibitive cost of arbitration
could be a basis for invalidating an agreement to arbitrate, and we decline to do
so in this case.").
51. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (deciding that
indigent divorce claimants have right of access to court without payment of
filing fees because marriage is fundamental and dissolution is possible only
through the courts); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding there
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the courts. For example, an indigent bankruptcy petitioner
does not have a right to free access to bankruptcy court
because the personal interest at stake is not fundamental
and because there are other methods of protecting the
interest, for example, through negotiated agreement with
creditors.52 Similarly, welfare recipients have no right to
appeal an adverse welfare benefits decision without the
payment of a filing fee."
Thus, the Court provides virtually no redress for a
potential litigant prevented from obtaining access to the
court system as a result of financial circumstances. It will,
however, invalidate an otherwise valid private agreement
to arbitrate because a potential claimant cannot afford to
arbitrate. The situations are not exactly analogous, of
course. The Supreme Court's access to courts jurisprudence
turns on constitutional issues and the ability of a
government institution to pass some of its costs onto
litigants; its arbitration holdings focus on protection of
statutory rights and the legitimacy of private agreements
which may interfere with Congressional objectives.54
Nonetheless, the Court's willingness to inquire into a
party's financial situation to evaluate access to an arbitral
forum (with the possible result that the party may then
utilize the courts), but not to the judicial system, suggests a
bias against arbitration.
2. Generalized Assessments of Access to Arbitration. A
modification of the case-by-case approach advanced in
Green Tree focuses more broadly, permitting a party to
demonstrate that potential arbitration costs are significant
enough to deter the actions of similarly situated individuals
who may seek to vindicate federal statutory rights through
is a right of access to court in civil cases only where fundamental interest, such
as termination of parental rights, is at stake, and resort to judicial process
mandatory). Whereas the claims in Boddie and M.L.B. dealt with access to the
court to vindicate divorce and parental rights, Randolph's complaint involved
her purchase of a mobile home.
52. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443-46 (1973).
53. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973).
54. If Congress chose to do so, it could of course require, through the FAA or
in particular statutes, that any party to an arbitration, defending its practices
against an alleged violation of a federal statutory right, would bear the burden
of arbitration costs.
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arbitration.55 This approach differs from that described
.above by focusing on the chilling effects of cost-splitting
provisions generally as opposed to its effect on the actual
plaintiff in the case. If a cost-splitting provision would deter
a substantial number of potential claimants, it undermines
the broader social purposes of the statutes alleged to have
been violated. The Sixth Circuit in Morrison v. Circuit City
explained this approach by reference to Gilmer, which held
that "[s]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent function."56 In other words, the
approach accounts for both the remedial and deterrent roles
of federal anti-discrimination statutes. To protect the
statutory rights at issue, the court must consider similar
potential claimants as well as the actual claimant, since the
potentialit y of significant claims deters discriminatory
practices.!5
This more generalized assessment of the effects of costs
on the ability of individuals to enforce their statutory rights
through arbitration raises the issues identified in the
preceding section. Why does an inability to afford
arbitration costs ensure access to the civil justice system,
while an inability to afford court costs is irrelevant to that
access?
3. Per Se Rules. A minority of courts have rejected the
Green Tree approach and adopted a rule which carries
greater evidence of hostility to arbitration. These courts,
55. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 676-78 (6th
Cir. 2003); West Virginia ex rel. Dunlap v Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 282 (W. Va.
2002) ("[W]e hold that provisions in a contract of adhesion that if applied would
impose unreasonably burdensome costs upon or would have a substantial
deterrent effect upon a person seeking to enforce and vindicate rights and
protections or to obtain statutory or common-law relief and remedies that are
afforded by or arise under state law that exists for the benefit and protection of
the public are unconscionable.").
56. Morrison, 317 at 658 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985))).
57. Other courts have taken a similar approach, although less explicitly. For
example, in Shankle, the court concluded that an arbitration agreement was
unenforceable because the plaintiff could not afford the fee, "and it is unlikely
that other similarly situated employees could either." Shankle v. B-G Maint.
Mgmt. of Colo., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (10thCir. 1999).
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which include the Ninth Circuit,58 district courts in Iowa
5 9
and Oregon," and the California state courts,6 have
adopted a per se rule that fee-splitting arrangements
render an arbitration agreement invalid.62 The seminal case
58. See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1174, 1178
n.17 (9th Cir.2003) (finding the cost-splitting provision of the Circuit City
arbitration agreement, providing that arbitrator had discretion to require
unsuccessful employee to pay Circuit City's costs and to require successful
employee to pay her share of the costs of arbitration, unconscionable and in
opposition to Congress's intent in enacting civil rights statutes); Ting v. AT&T,
319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003); Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus.,
Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the arbitration scheme at
issue "imposes multiple fees which would bring the cost of arbitration for [the
employee] into the thousands of dollars").
59. See, e.g., Faber v. Menard, Inc., 267 F.Supp. 2d 961, 986-87 (N.D. Iowa
2003) (refusing to sever cost provisions of arbitration agreement in employment
agreement which included a "pay own costs" provision and required payment of
half arbitrator's fees, since parties' resources and access to counsel are
disparate and would deter pursuit of otherwise valid statutory claims; no
inquiry into employee's particular financial circumstances).
60. See, e.g., Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F.Supp. 2d 862, 875 (D.
Or. 2002) ("Requiring payment of arbitrator's fees, as opposed to reasonable
costs, is not permitted as a condition of arbitration."). Similarly, the court in
Lelouis seems to be rejecting Green Tree in stating,
the issue here is not just whether the costs in this particular case
would deter this particular plaintiff from arbitrating her claims. That
could necessitate a fact-intensive inquiry into the plaintiffs assets and
ability to pay, whether someone might lend her the money, etc.
However, it is neither necessary, nor efficient, for the court to examine
such matters for each arbitration agreement. The better approach is
that taken by the California Supreme Court in Armendariz, which
'places the cost of arbitration on the party that imposes it.' This rule
applies only when an employer demands that an employee sign an
arbitration agreement; it does not apply to freely negotiated arbitration
agreements.
Lelouis v. W. Directory Co., 230 F.Supp. 2d 1214, 1224 (D.Or. 2001) (citations
omitted) (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d
669, 682 n.8, 688 (Cal. 2000)).
61. The leading case on this issue is Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 687-88.
62. The Tenth Circuit has been cited as adopting the per se rule, but a
careful reading of the case in question demonstrates that it has not actually
done so. In Shankle, the Tenth Circuit asserted that an arbitration must
provide an adequate forum for the resolution of federal statutory claims. See
Shankle, 163 F.3d at 1233-34 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). The Court also cited Cole, the seminal case adopting the
per se rule that fee splitting provisions render an arbitration agreement invalid.
Shankle, 163 F.3d at 1233 (citing Cole v. Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468
(D.C. Cir. 1997)). A number of courts have cited Shankle as adopting the per se
rule. See, e.g., Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 763 (5th Cir.
1999). The Shankle court, however, actually applied the case-by-case rule,
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adopting a per se rule that cost-splitting invalidates an
arbitration agreement is Cole v. Burns International
Security Services,63 a D.C. Circuit Court opinion which
predated the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree.
Although it has not yet directly addressed the question of
Green Tree's impact on Cole, the D.C. Circuit has retreated
from its holding in Cole. In LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co., Inc.,' the D.C. Circuit Court held that, given the
limited fees assessed against the plaintiff, she failed to
prove a claim that the possibility of substantial fees
prevented her from attempting to vindicate her statutory
rights. Without overruling Cole, the court declined to follow
Cole's per se rule that fee shifting renders an arbitration
agreement unenforceable. Following LaPrade, the Court
refused to extend Cole to non-statutory state claims.65 Other
courts have declined to follow Cole based on their reading of
Green Tree.66 The Eleventh Circuit, which had adopted a per
reviewing the plaintiffs financial situation and holding that he could not afford
the fees, and adding "it is unlikely other similarly situated employees could
either." 163 F.3d at 1234-35. This last statement along with the approving
citation of Cole injects some ambiguity into the Tenth Circuit's position, but
Shankle has been read by other federal courts as effectively adopting the
majority case-by-case rule. See, e.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort
Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1259 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003); Morrison v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 648 n.4 (6th Cir. 2003); Bradford v. Rockwell
Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 555 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Notably, although
Shankle found that the fee-splitting provision rendered the arbitration
agreement unenforceable, it framed its analysis in terms of the complaining
party's actual inability to afford the arbitration costs and fees."); Perez v.
Hospitality Ventures-Denver LLC, 245 F.Supp. 2d 1172, 1173 (D. Colo. 2003)
(reading Shankle as requiring individualized assessments of particular
claimant's ability to access the arbitral forum).
In Ball v. SFX Broadcasting, Inc., 165 F.Supp. 2d 230, 239-40 (N.D.N.Y.
2001), the District Court read Green Tree as requiring that a party seeking to
avoid arbitration must show only the "likelihood" of incurring prohibitive
arbitration costs and distinguished this analysis from the analysis adopted by
courts focusing on the financial situation of the particular plaintiff. The District
Court, however stopped short of adopting a per se rule, holding that the
plaintiff had demonstrated that she could not afford the fees which would be
imposed on her in the arbitration.
63. 105 F.3d at 1468 (holding that fee-splitting provisions in arbitration
agreements per se invalid because such cost obligations deter or prohibit
employees from pursuing their statutory rights in an arbitral forum).
64. 246 F.3d 702, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that Cole only prohibited
the assessment of "arbitration-related costs that are analogous to a judge's
salary or expenses in a traditional judicial forum.").
65. See Brown v. Wheat First Secs., Inc., 257 F.3d 821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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se rule,67 retreated from those pre-Green Tree holdings in
Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale,68 based on
its reading of Green Tree.
All of the decisions adopting a per se rule that cost-
splitting provisions invalidate an arbitration agreement run
counter to Green Tree. Under Green Tree, a party resisting
arbitration shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating
the likelihood of incurring prohibitively expensive
arbitration costs. 69 The Supreme Court found an arbitration
agreement that was silent about the costs of the arbitration
enforceable, because the record did not contain any
evidence that the individual plaintiff would bear expenses
that would effectively prohibit arbitration of her statutory
66. See, e.g., Raasch v. NCR Corp., 254 F.Supp. 2d 847, 858 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
(noting that the holdings in Cole, Paladino, and Armendariz are "questionable,"
given the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Green Tree). See also Sparks
v. Stone St. Capital, Inc., No. 3-02-CV-724-R, 2002 WL 1575404 (N.D. Tex. July
15, 2002) (reading Shankle, supra note 47, which relied on Cole, as being
overruled by Green Tree); Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F.Supp. 2d 771 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002); Klinedinst v. Tiger Drylac, U.S.A., Inc., No. 01CV040, 2001 WL
1561821 (D.N.H. Nov. 28, 2001) (finding the Cole rationale unpersuasive
because it predates Green Tree); Manuel v. Honda R & D Americas, Inc., 175
F.Supp. 2d 987 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (holding that a per se invalidation of an
arbitration agreement, due to the presence of a fee-splitting provision,
contradicts the Supreme Court's holding in Green Tree); Boyd v. Hayneville, AL,
144 F.Supp. 2d 1272, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (arguing that given Supreme
Court's decision in Green Tree, "prudent course" is to follow circuit courts which
have declined to adopt a per se rule against fee-splitting; arbitration-related
expenses acceptable so long as they do not render arbitral forum inaccessible);
Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life & Health, 23 P.3d 1249 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001);
and Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 872, 889 (N.J. 2002) (dissenting
opinion).
67. See, e.g., Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2002);
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1057-58 (11th Cir.
1998).
68. Compare Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255,
1259 (11th Cir. 2003) ("After Green Tree, an arbitration agreement is not
unenforceable merely because it may involve some 'fee-shifting.' The party
seeking to avoid arbitration under such an agreement has the burden of
establishing that enforcement of the agreement would 'preclude' him from
'effectively vindicating [his] federal statutory right in the arbitral forum.' "),
with Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (recognizing
that under Green Tree, a Title VII plaintiff attempting to avoid his agreement
to arbitrate his discrimination claim by arguing that prohibitive arbitration
costs would undermine his statutory remedy must demonstate that he is likely
to bear such costs).
69. 531 U.S. at 92.
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claims." Thus, the Supreme Court focused on the individual
employee's ability or inability to demonstrate economic
inaccessibility of the arbitral forum. This language
indicates that the Supreme Court envisions a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether imposition of costs, including
through fee-splitting agreements, are enforceable.71
The federal court cases holding that cost-splitting
provisions automatically invalidate an arbitration
agreement 72 raise questions of the correct interpretation of
the Federal Arbitration Act and its reconciliation with
various federal statutes. These federal courts' willingness to
invalidate a private arbitration agreement, simply because
it requires a party claiming federal statutory rights to pay a
share of arbitration costs, demonstrates a clear bias against
arbitration. Other cases decided by these courts do not find
an agreement substantively unconscionable merely because
it requires some payment by the weaker party. Particularly
against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's access to
courts jurisprudence, these decisions demonstrate a
differential application of the standards of substantive
unconscionability to arbitration and nonarbitration
agreements.
The California state court cases involve the additional
issue of preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act. The
seminal case, Armendariz, held that mandatory arbitration
agreements requiring arbitration of California Fair
Employment and Housing Act 73 claims oblige an employer
to pay all costs unique to arbitration. 74 According to the
court, "when an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as
a condition of employment, the arbitration agreement or
arbitration process cannot generally require the employee
to bear any type of expense that the employee would not be
required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in
court." 5 The Armendariz holding, which predated the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree, and
70. See id. at 90-91.
71. Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer disagreed with the
majority on these points, focusing on the accessibility of arbitration to
employees generally, and seemingly advocating a per se rule which would place
the burden of proof on the employer.
72. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
73. CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 12900-12909 (1992).
74. These consist of fees above court fees and arbitrator's fees.
75. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 687 (emphasis in original).
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which relied heavily on the now questionable D.C. Circuit
Court decision of Cole v. Burns International Security
Service," has nonetheless been followed" and extended by
the California state and federal courts to other statutory
and nonstatutory claims.79
The California Supreme Court recognizes that its
holdings raise preemption issues but recently concluded in
Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc.," that the Federal Arbitration
Act and the United States Supreme Court's interpretation
of it in Green Tree do not preempt the California approach.
The California Supreme Court avoided Green Tree's
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act by
characterizing as dicta its holdings that employers may not
impose prohibitive arbitration costs on employees and that
whether costs are prohibitive must be determined case-by-
case with the employee bearing the burden of proof.81 The
Little Court concluded,
Armendariz's cost-shifting requirement is not preempted by the
FAA. It is not a barrier to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, nor does it improperly disfavor arbitration in
comparison to other contract clauses. Rather, it is derived from
76. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
77. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that a fee allocation provision requiring employee to share
arbitration costs was in itself sufficient to invalidate arbitration agreement).
78. See Ting v. AT&T, 182 F.Supp. 2d 902, 926-27 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding
arbitration agreement between telephone service provider and customers
invalid as limitation of consumer rights under California Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1751, 1781(a), 1783); Mercuro v. Superior
Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (applying Armendariz
holding to claims alleging violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 230.8 and 970).
79. See Boghos v. Lloyd's of London, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(extending Armendariz holding to invalidate insurance policy arbitration clause
which required claimant for disability benefits to split arbitration costs); Little
v. Auto Stiegler Inc., 63 P.3d 979 (Cal. 2003) (extending Armendariz holding to
nonstatutory claims involving fundamental public policy, specifically judicially-
created claim known as "Tameny claim" under which an employer may not
terminate an at-will employee for reasons that would be contrary to public
policy). Not all California courts have agreed. See, e.g., Swiderski v. Milberg,
Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, LLP, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (declining to extend Armendariz to nonstatutory wrongful termination
claim).
80. 63 P.3d 979 (2003).
81. Id.
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state contract law principles regarding the unavailability of
certain public rights in the context of a contract of adhesion.
8 2
The court's logic is flawed. Arbitration is simply an
alternative method for resolving disputes and vindicating
rights.83 Agreeing to arbitrate rights clearly does not entail
a waiver of those rights," unless (perhaps), as Green Tree
holds, costs render the arbitral forum inaccessible to a
particular potential claimant. The per se approach of
Armendariz and its progeny thus conflicts with the basic
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, "to place arbitration
agreements on the same footing as other contracts."" Under
the rule of Armendariz, parties to an arbitration contract
cannot, unlike parties to other types of contracts or parties
to arbitration contracts in other jurisdictions, expect
judicial enforcement of their contract. California courts
treat arbitration agreements differently precisely because
they are arbitration agreements, in direct contradiction of
the Federal Arbitration Act. Despite the California
Supreme Court's protestations to the contrary, the Federal
Arbitration Act in fact preempts Armendariz and its
progeny.
B. Limitations of Damages Which May Be Awarded in
Arbitration
Case law is divided on the issue of whether prohibition
or limitation of punitive damages in an arbitration
agreement is enforceable. The United States Supreme
Court has not specifically decided whether it is
unconscionable to prohibit an arbitral award of punitive
damages. 6 It has, however, indicated that the parties'
82. Id. at 992.
83. Green Tree and other Supreme Court cases make this clear.
84. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 ("[Bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.")
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler- Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
85. Id. at 24.
86. See PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003) (explaining
plaintiffs' argument that arbitration provisions, which prohibited punitive
damages, impeded RICO claims for which treble damages were available, 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c); Supreme Court compelled arbitration, holding that arbitration
agreement was ambiguous as to whether it contravened RICO, since treble
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agreement as to punitive damages in an arbitration
agreement is generally enforceable. 7 In accordance with
that holding, the D.C.,88 Seventh, 9 and Fifth Circuits," as
well as the federal district court in the Central District of
912California" and the Mississippi Supreme Court,92 have
ruled that agreements prohibiting or limiting the award of
punitive damages in arbitration are enforceable. In
contrast, state courts in Alabama, 3  California,"
damages are considered "remedial" not punitive, and it was merely speculative
to assume that arbitrator will interpret ambiguous provisions as contrary to
RICO).
87. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56-57
(1995).
88. See Brown v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, 267 F.Supp. 2d 61 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (holding prohibition of punitive damages not unconscionable).
89. See Hawkins v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801 (7th Cir. 2003)(rejecting claim that prohibition on recovery of punitive damages in arbitration
agreement rendered it unconscionable).
90. See Inv. Partners, L.P. v. Glamour Shots Licensing, Inc., 298 F.3d 314,
318 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Provisions in arbitration agreements that prohibit
punitive damages are generally enforceable.").
91. See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. SAC 03-130 DOC. 2003 WL
21530185 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003) (commenting on no support for the
proposition that prohibition on punitive damages, standing alone, renders
arbitration agreement unenforceable); Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F.Supp.
2d 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding provision of arbitration clause waiving claims
for punitives not substantively unconscionable; limit applied only to extent
allowed by law).
92. See Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Gatlin, 848 So. 2d 828, 854-55 (Miss. 2003)(holding mutual exclusion of recovery of punitive damages enforceable as
according with "sound business sense" and not contradicting Mississippi public
policy). An earlier decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court reached a contrary
conclusion. See East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 2002) (holding
limitation on punitive damages unconscionable).
93. See, e.g., Anderson v. Ashby, No. 1011740, 2003 WL 21125998 (Ala. May
16, 2003) (limitation of punitive damages to 5 times economic loss for borrower
unconscionable; no limit for lender) (See, J., dissenting); Ex Parte Celtic Life
Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 2002) (holding arbitration clause prohibiting
recovery of punitive damages unenforceable; insurance company waived clause
and remainder of agreement enforced); Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 733-
34 (Ala. 2002) (See, J., dissenting) (describing how it is against public policy for
private parties to contract away liability for punitive damages; clause severed
as per severance clause in arbitration agreement); Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v.
Jackson, 823 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 2001) (holding arbitration clause that forbids an
arbitrator from awarding punitive damages is void as contrary to public policies
of protecting citizens in legislatively prescribed actions from wrongful behavior
and punishing wrongdoers; clause severed in accordance with severance
provision in agreement).
94. See, e.g., Pardee Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding limit on punitive damages unconscionable);
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Pennsylvania,95 and West Virginia," have ruled that
limitation of punitive damages in arbitration agreements is
unconscionable. The Ninth Circuit has reached a similar
conclusion, but only with regard to limitation of punitive
damages to which a party may be entitled by statute."
For the most part, the state court decisions holding
punitive damages limitations unconscionable will survive
preemption challenges. These decisions will generally fall
within Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. Limits on
punitive damages often involve some measure of procedural
unconscionability, in that the drafter of the arbitration
agreement has superior bargaining power and in some
sense forces the terms upon a weaker party, such as a
consumer or an employee. Since the threat of punitive
damages serves the important public policies of deterring
various sorts of antisocial behavior, prohibitions of punitive
damages may also be substantively unconscionable.
In some instances, however, courts appear to use
unconscionability principles differently in the context of
arbitration than in other contexts, and in these cases
preemption challenges should succeed under the rule of
Adamany v. Superior Court, No. B156220, 2002 WL 1722412 (Cal. Ct. App. July
25, 2002) (holding limit on punitive damages unconscionable; court severed and
enforced remainder of arbitration agreement).
95. See, e.g., Carll v. Terminix Int'l Co., L.P., 793 A.2d 921, 923 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2002) (holding that arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it
precluded arbitrator from awarding "special, incidental, consequential,
exemplary or punitive damages").
96. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002)
(holding that arbitration agreement which prohibited punitive damages and use
of class action was unenforceable as against West Virginia public policy;
defendant may not shield itself through adhesive contracts from an important
sanction provided by law for the public benefit).
97. See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding arbitration agreement unconscionable because, inter alia, it limited
availability of punitive damages, proscribing available statutory remedies
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a and 2000e-5(g)(1)); see also Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO
Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 907 (1995)
(holding that clause prohibiting arbitrator from assessing punitive damages
was invalid because it required plaintiff to surrender statutory remedies for
alleged violations of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act). Most circuit court
decisions are to the contrary. See Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Servs., Inc.,
346 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Hawkins v. Aid Ass'n for
Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2003); Bob Schultz Motors, Inc. v.
Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 334 F.3d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 2003); Larry's
United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2001).
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Doctor's Associates.8 For example, the Alabama Supreme
Court in Anderson v. Ashby" found unconscionable an
arbitration agreement's limitation of the consumer's
punitive damages to five times economic loss. Under the
Alabama Code, punitive damage awards may not exceed
three times compensatory damages (or $500,000, whichever
is greater).'00 Alabama courts use a two-part test to assess
unconscionability: a contract is unconscionable if (1) its
terms are grossly favorable (2) to a party with
overwhelming bargaining power.101 Given the existence of
punitive damages caps established by the Alabama
legislature, and in particular the legislature's use of a
multiplier, the contractual limit on punitive damages at
issue in Anderson can hardly be termed "grossly" favorable
to the drafter of the arbitration agreement, who would have
enjoyed a comparable, or greater, advantage in a
courtroom." 2 Similarly, the Alabama Supreme Court could
not plausibly defend its ruling in Anderson on public policy
grounds given the legislative cap.
The California decisions may be subject to similar
criticisms. The California Civil Code limits punitive
damages in certain circumstances. For example, punitive
98. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
99. No. 1011740, 2003 WL 21125998 (Ala. May 16, 2003) (See, J., concurring
in the result in part, dissenting in part).
100. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (1975). There are statutory exceptions to this
general rule for particular circumstances.
101. See, e.g., Am. Gen. Fin., Inc. v. Branch, 793 So.2d 738, 748 (Ala. 2000).
102. Other jurisdictions which have enacted similar tort reform measures
regarding punitive damages would also face limitations on the use of the
unconscionability doctrine. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Michie 2002) (3 times
compensatory damages or $500,000); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-
102 (West 1997) (no more than actual damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West
2003) (3 times compensatory damages or $500,000, or in egregious
circumstances, 4 times compensatory damages or $2 million, with additional
exception for specific intent to harm); IDAHO CODE § 6-1604 (Michie 2001) (3
times compensatory damages or $250,000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (1994)
(annual gross income of defendant or $5 million); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65
(2004) (sliding scale based on defendant's net worth; for example, no more than
4% of defendant's net worth for defendants with net worth of $50 million or
less); NEV. REV. STAT. 42.005 (1998) (3 times compensatory damages if
compensatory damages are $100,000 or more; $300,000 if compensatory
damages are less than $100,000, with exceptions for specific circumstances);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (West 1987) (5 times compensatory damages or
$350,000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (1991) (two times compensatory
damages or $250,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 2001) (no more than
$350,000 against all defendants).
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damages may not be recovered against a health care
provider. °3 In a case where a consumer is unfairly denied
credit, punitive damages may not exceed $10,000.104 If the
legislature may eliminate or limit punitive damages in
certain situations, it may be difficult to sustain the
argument that a private limitation of punitive damages is
always harsh, oppressive, and grossly unfair.
In general, limitations of damages other than punitive
damages in arbitration agreements have not been held to be
unconscionable, 5 given the widespread acceptance of such
contractual limitations. 6  In special circumstances,
however, a limitation of damages may be unconscionable.
For example, in O'Donoghue v. Smythe, Cramer & Co. 107 the
court ruled a home inspector's limitation of liability to $265
in an arbitration agreement unconscionable since it
precluded any meaningful remedy, given the costs of
arbitration. Cases like O'Donoghue may also exemplify
103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13 (West 2004).
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1787.3 (West 1985).
105. See Telecom Int'l Am., Ltd. v. AT & T Corp., 280 F.3d 175 (2d Cir.
2001) (holding that remedies for failure of goods are limited; exclusion of
consequential damages permitted; no failure of essential purpose under UCC 2-
719); see also MRO Communications Inc. v. AT & T, No. 98-16716, slip op. at 4
(9th Cir. Dec. 13, 1999) (limitation of damages clause); Networktwo
Communications Group, Inc. v. Spring Valley Mktg., No. 99-72913, 2003 WL
11197633 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2003); Agri-Mark, Inc. v. Niro, Inc., 233 F.Supp.
2d 200 (D. Mass. 2002) (limitation of damages not unconscionable); Best
Vendors Co. v. Air Express, Inc., No. Civ. 00-2224, 2002 WL 31163039 (D. Minn.
Sept. 23, 2002) (holding that provision prohibiting damages for termination was
not unconscionable); Sears Termite & Pest Control, Inc. v. Robinson, No.
1020304, 2003 WL 21205646 (Ala. May 23, 2003) (limitation of consequential
damages).
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1979); see also U.C.C.,
§ 2-719. Section 2-719 provides: (1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2)
and (3) of this section and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation
of damages, (a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in
substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the
measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's
remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and
replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; and (b) resort to a remedy as
provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in
which case it is the sole remedy. (2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided
in this Act. (3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages
for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
107. No. 80453, 2002 WL 1454074 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 2002).
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arbitration-specific uses of unconscionability. Limitations of
remedy provisions may preclude a potential litigant from
actually bringing an action in court, but that is not a
sufficient ground for avoiding the limitation.
C. Forum Selection Clauses
Forum selection clauses are presumptively valid under
long-standing precedent.' °8 Under the Supreme Court's test,
a forum selection clause is enforceable unless:
(1) [its] incorporation into the contract was the result of fraud,
undue influence, or overweening bargaining power[;] (2) the
selected forum is so "gravely difficult and inconvenient" that the
complaining party will "for all practical purposes be deprived of its
day in court[;]" or (3) [its] enforcement ... would contravene a
strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is brought,
[declared by statute or judicial decision.].. 9
Most forum selection clauses pass this test."'
However, federal and state courts in California,"' the
federal circuit court in Hawaii,"' the federal district courts
108. See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
109. Id. at 10.
110. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528,
541, (1995) (enforcing arbitration forum selection clause in international bill of
lading); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991)(enforcing forum selection clause in consumer contract); Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518-20 (1974) (enforcing arbitration forum selection
clause in securities fraud case); Sec. Watch, Inc. v. Sentinel Sys., Inc., 176 F.3d
369 (6th Cir. 1999); Outek Caribbean Distribs., Inc. v. Echo, Inc., 206 F.Supp.
2d 263 (D. P.R. 2002); Dassero v. Edwards, 190 F.Supp. 2d 544 (W.D.N.Y.
2002); Gill v. Jim Walter Homes of La., Inc., 187 F.Supp. 2d 618 (W.D. La.
2002); Benefit Ass'n Int'l., Inc. v. Mount Sinai Comprehensive Cancer Ctr., 816
So. 2d 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (finding no procedural unconscionability;
no showing that arbitration in designated forum would be so gravely difficult
and inconvenient that it would, for all practical purposes, deprive claimant of
an effective forum); Info Leasing Corp. v. Jaskot, 784 N.E.2d 1192 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003).
111. See Wilmot v. McNabb, No. C-0203720-JF, 2003 WL 21512814 (N.D.
Cal. July 2, 2003) (holding that forum selection clause which required weaker
party to arbitrate in nondomiciliary forum was substantively unconscionable,
but that it could be severed from arbitration agreement); see also Comb v.
PayPal, Inc., 218 F.Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that although
forum selection clauses are generally presumed prima facie valid, a forum
selection clause unconscionable if "place or manner" in which arbitration is to
occur is unreasonable taking into account "the respective circumstances of the
parties"); GMAC Commercial Fin. LLC v. Super. Ct., No. B166070, 2003 WL
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in Illinois..3 and Ohio,' 4 and state courts in Kentucky,1
5
Missouri, "6and Montana 17 have ruled that forum selection
clauses in arbitration agreements are unenforceable under
21398319 (Cal. Ct. App. June 18, 2003) (stating that California courts will not
enforce a forum selection clause where it will deprive plaintiff of benefits of a
California statute that would otherwise govern) (Turner, J. dissenting, on basis
that no evidence that forum selection clause adhesive or unconscionable or that
selected forum would fail to apply law); Stone v. Memberworks Inc., No.
G030740, 2003 WL 21246771 (Cal. Ct. App. May 30, 2003) (holding that it was
unconscionable to require California consumers to arbitrate in Connecticut);
Bolter v. Super. Ct., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that an
arbitration agreement requiring a weaker party to resolve disputes in a
geographically distant state substantively unconscionable).
112. See, e.g., Domingo v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 02-15232, 2003 WL
21675550, at *1 (9th Cir. July 14, 2003) (holdng that a forum selection clause
requiring Hawaii employees to arbitrate claims against an employer in
California "strongly supports a finding of unconscionability" since costs of travel
and arbitration might exceed damages).
113. See Plattner v. Edge Solutions Inc., No. 03 C 2646, 2003 WL 22859532,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2003) (holding that a forum selection clause requiring an
Illinois resident to arbitrate in Suffolk County, New York was unconscionable
solely on substantive grounds).
114. Hagedorn v. Veritas Software Corp., 250 F.Supp. 2d 857, 862 (S.D.
Ohio 2002) (holding that a forum selection clause requiring a life-long Ohio
resident to arbitrate in San Francisco was unconscionable). But see Lindsey v.
Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc., No. 19903, 2003 WL 22972357 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
19, 2003) (holding that a forum selection clause in an arbitration agreement
was not unconscionable where plaintiff failed to demonstrate financial inability
to travel to the designated forum).
115. See Wilder v. Absorption Corp., 107 S.W.3d 181, 185 (Ky. 2003)
(holding that enforcement of the arbitration clause requiring arbitration in
Washington, defendant's principal place of business, was so unjust and
inconvenient as to deprive Kentucky claimants of opportunity for hearing). The
dissenter noted that Wilder was a businessman who sought to do business with
a corporation knowing that its corporate headquarters were in Washington,
freely signed an employment contract knowing that it required any contractual
disputes to be resolved in Washington, and negotiated other terms of the
contract, choosing to leave this term intact. Id. at 188-89 (Cooper, J.,
dissenting).
116. See Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., No. ED 82788, 2003 WL 22890022, at
*3-4 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2003) (holding that an agreement to arbitrate was
enforceable, because unconscionable forum selection clause was separable from
the general agreement to arbitrate). But see High Life Sales, Co. v. Brown-
Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. 1992) ("By this opinion, we join the
better-reasoned majority rule and will enforce [forum selection] clauses .... ).
117. See Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1245-46 (Mont.
1998) (holding a forum selection clause void as against public policy expressed
in Montana statutes, where a seller and installer of a computer system moved
to compel arbitration in California in accordance with a forum selection clause
in an arbitration agreement).
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Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act because they are
unconscionable. These decisions are likely preempted under
the Federal Arbitration Act since they generally appear to
treat forum selection clauses in arbitration agreements
differently than in nonarbitration agreements. For
example, California courts have recently enforced forum
selection clauses against a policyholder suing in California
whose policy specified that any lawsuit would be heard in
an Ontario, Canada court,118 against a consumer protection
organization suing on behalf of California consumers whose
contracts specified New Jersey as the forum,119 and against
a California former employee whose stock options
agreement specified that any disputes would be resolved in
the courts of Hamburg, Germany. ' The fact that the
contracts were adhesive was irrelevant according to the
decisions. 12' Because these same courts reach a different
conclusion for arbitration agreements, finding those
agreements unconscionable as a result of a forum selection
clause, those decisions are preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act.'22
The Montana case requires a different analysis. In
Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems Corp.,23 the Montana
118. Shepherd v. Dominion of Can. Gen. Ins. Co., No. D039718, 2003 WL
21388251, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. June 17, 2003).
119. Net2Phone, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 149, 153 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) ("The fact that the forum selection clause may have been a 'take it or
leave it' proposition, and not vigorously 'bargained for' as Consumer Cause
contends, does not make the clause unenforceable.").
120. Intershop Communications v. Super. Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 847 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) ("A forum selection clause within an adhesion contract will be
enforced 'as long as the clause provided adequate notice to the [party] that he
was agreeing to the jurisdiction cited in the contract.'").
121. See Shepherd, 2003 WL 21388251 at *7 (noting that voluntary forum
selection clauses do not offend due process); Net2Phone, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152
(noting that entering a contract voluntarily makes a forum selection clause
valid); Intershop, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855 (holding that adhesion contracts are,
nonetheless, valid and existing contracts.).
122. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Perry v. Thomas: "A
court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration
agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it
otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state law." 482 U.S. 483,
493 n.9 (1996). See also Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 n.3
(1996) (citing Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 n.9) (holding that a court may not "rely on
the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding
that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to
effect what ... the state legislature cannot.").
123. 971 P.2d 1240 (Mont. 1998)
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Supreme Court found a contract provision calling for
arbitration of any disputes in California invalid as violating
Montana Code §§ 28-2-708, which provides:
Every stipulation or condition in a contract by which any party
thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract
by the usual proceedings in the ordinary tribunals... is void. This
section does not affect the validity of an agreement enforceable
under Title 27, Chapter 5.124
Title 27, Chapter 5 of the Montana Code Annotated
includes the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act. In pertinent
part, it provides: "No agreement concerning venue involving
a resident of this state is valid unless the agreement
requires that arbitration occur within the state of Montana.
This requirement may only be waived upon the advice of
counsel as evidenced by counsel's signature thereto.,
125
The court found that § 28-2-708 protects Montana
residents from having to litigate outside of Montana.
Section 27-5-323 provides the same protection for Montana
residents who have agreed to arbitrate, in the absence of
waiver made upon the advice of counsel. The court
accordingly held the forum selection clause in the
arbitration agreement void because it violated Montana
law. The Federal Arbitration Act did not preempt
Montana's statutory law, since sections 28-2-708 and 27-5-
323, respectively, articulate the same rules for contracts
generally and arbitration agreements. In short, Montana
law does not distinguish between forum selection clauses
which are part of contracts generally, and forum selection
clauses found in agreements to arbitrate. The court relied
on Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which permits
judicial invalidation of an arbitration agreement "upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract,' 26 and on the Supreme Court's decision in Doctor's
Associates, which clarified the scope of Federal Arbitration
Act preemption:
Courts may not... invalidate arbitration agreements under state
laws applicable only to arbitration provisions. By enacting §§ 2, we
have several times said, Congress precluded States from singling
124. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (2003).
125. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-323 (2003).
126. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead
that such provisions be placed 'upon the same footing as other
contracts.'
The Montana court found further that its decision was
consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act because the
parties' obligation to arbitrate was enforced; only the forum
selection clause was invalidated, and such a clause would
have been invalidated in the context of litigation as well.
D. Confidentiality
Many arbitration agreements provide that the
arbitration proceedings and the award must be kept
confidential. The majority of courts have held these
provisions unconscionable. 8 Only a few courts have found
127. 517 U.S. at 687-88 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
128. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
plaintiffs were unable to mitigate AT&T's advantages inherent in being a
repeat player as a result of confidentiality provision, and thus the provision was
unconscionable), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003); Cole v. Burns Int'l. Sec.
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding confidentiality in
arbitration awards unconscionable because secrecy favors companies, who as
repeat participants have superior information about arbitrators and may
prevent potential plaintiffs from establishing intentional misconduct or a
pattern or practice of discrimination by particular companies; confidentiality
also precludes deterrent effect of adverse findings); Plaskett v. Bechtel Int'l,
Inc., 243 F.Supp. 2d 334, 344-45 (D. Virgin Islands 2003) (holding that
provisions requiring confidentiality or arbitration, preventing inclusion of the
party's name in arbitration award at the party's unilateral option, and
permitting closed hearings at the arbitrator's discretion were unconscionable);
Lloyd v. Hovensa LLC., 243 F.Supp. 2d 346, 352 (D. Virgin Islands 2003)
(finding that since the confidentiality provisions were collateral to the
arbitration agreement, the provisions could be severed and the agreement
enforced, even though the provisions were unconscionable to the extent they
provided for confidentiality); Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F.Supp. 2d
862, 865 (D. Or. 2002) (finding confidentiality provisions unconscionable where
the drafter was in a "vastly superior legal posture" and no rationale was given
for the provisions); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F.Supp. 2d 1166,
1180-81 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (holding that confidentiality provisions advantage
repeat participants and are thus unconscionable); Acorn v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
211 F.Supp. 2d 1160, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding confidentiality provisions
unconscionable because they affect outcomes of arbitrations and favor
defendant/drafter); cf. Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont.
2002) (providing guidance to future litigants by listing this question as relevant:
"Are arbitration proceedings shrouded in secrecy so as to conceal illegal,
oppressive or wrongful business practices?"), cert denied, 538 U.S. 956 (2003).
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otherwise.'29 Despite their facial neutrality, these provisions
favor the drafter of arbitration agreements. The drafter is
likely a repeat participant in arbitrations, and so has
advantages in arbitrator selection and case presentation. 3 '
One-time participants in arbitration have no hope of
countering these advantages if information about past
arbitrations is kept secret. The one-sided advantages of
confidentiality clauses thus create substantive
unconscionability.
Confidentiality of arbitration proceedings and awards
has no exact analogue for purposes of assessing whether
judicial responses to the issue vary from other contexts.
Perhaps the closest analogy is confidentiality of settlement
agreements and negotiations. Confidentiality of settlement
negotiations and agreements is supported by strong public
policies and grounded in long tradition. 3' Both settlement
129. See Ortiz v. Winona Mem. Hosp., No. 1:02-CV-1975-JDT-TAB, 2003
WL 21696524, at *3 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (finding confidentiality rules not
unconscionable; if they were, however, they could be severed as collateral to
main purpose of arbitration agreements); see also Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 793 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
130. See generally Alleyne, supra note 7, at 426 (arguing that employers
track arbitrator records and will dominate selection process); Lisa B. Bingham,
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMPL.
POL'Y J. 189, 213 (1997); Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute
Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 936; Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and
the Private Arbitration of Public Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 656;
Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for
Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 1, 4-5 (1994) (arguing that employees are disadvantaged vis-a-vis
employers in determining whether a given arbitrator is truly neutral because
employees lack financial resources to research an arbitrator's past decisions);
Sternlight, supra note 7, at 685 (arguing that "one-shot players" such as
employees and consumers are less able to make informed selections of
arbitrators than "repeat-player" companies). Other possible advantages, not
relevant here, include the ability to identify and settle meritorious cases and
the potential incentives for arbitrators to satisfy repeat participants.
131. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d
976, 980-81 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Herrnreiter v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 281
F.3d 634, 636-37 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that if parties request judicial
interpretation and enforcement of confidential settlement agreement, then that
agreement enters the record and becomes available to the public); Jessup v.
Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that settlement agreements
contained in court files must be disclosed because "documents in judicial files
are presumptively open to the public"); Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 865
(2d Cir. 1985) (citing In re Franklin Nat'l Bank, 92 F.R.D. 468, 472 (E.D.N.Y.
1981)) (stating that "[slecrecy of settlement terms ... is a well-established
American litigation practice").
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and arbitration are a means of alternative dispute
resolution; like arbitration, settlement may occur without
judicial involvement. Both are supported by strong public
policies favoring negotiated, nonjudicial resolution of
disputes. Both are viewed as more efficient and more cost-
effective than litigation. Both lessen the burdens on an
overtaxed judiciary. Additionally, confidentiality in both
arbitration and settlement presents problems for potential
claimants. Institutions which enter confidential
settlements, like institutions which resolve disputes
through confidential arbitration, are able to minimize
information available to potential claimants. Both potential
litigants and potential participants in arbitration will
consequently be impeded in their efforts to build a case,
particularly if they attempt to prove intentional misconduct
or a pattern and practice of misconduct.
There are, of course, differences between settlement
and arbitration which may provide additional justifications
for confidentiality in settlements, not applicable to
arbitration. Settlement negotiations are intended to obviate
the need for trial, while arbitration is intended from the
outset as a replacement for trial. Admissibility of
information from failed negotiations would create a
significant disincentive to settlement efforts. However, the
analogy between confidentiality of settlement and
arbitration awards is close. The fact that judges find
confidentiality requirements to be harsh, oppressive, and
ultimately unenforceable in the context of arbitration
agreements but perfectly acceptable in the context of
settlement agreements once again suggests a bias against
arbitration.
IV. ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE
The most notable example of modern judicial hostility
to arbitration took place in connection with the case of
Doctor's Associates."' In that case, the United States
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Montana
Supreme Court's decision that an arbitration clause in a
franchise agreement was unenforceable under Montana
law. On remand, Justices Trieweiler and Hunt of the
132. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)
(requiring states to treat arbitration provisions as any other contract).
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Montana Supreme Court refused to sign the order staying
the case pending arbitration. The justices stated, "[w]e
cannot in good conscience be an instrument of a policy
which is as legally unfounded, socially detrimental, and
philosophically misguided as the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in this and other cases which interpret and apply
the Federal Arbitration Act."'33 In his special concurrence to
the Montana Supreme Court's original opinion, Justice
Trieweiler criticized "federal judges who consider forced
arbitration as the panacea for their 'heavy case loads' and
who consider the reluctance of state courts to buy into the
arbitration program as a sign of intellectual inadequacy."
13 4
He enumerated the rules and procedures developed over a
century of Montana jurisprudence to ensure access to fair
dispute resolution.'35 He recognized that "[tihe procedures
we have established, and the laws we have enacted, are
either inapplicable or unenforceable in the process we refer
to as arbitration."36 In sum, Justice Trieweiler criticizes
federal judiciary for arrogance, preoccupation with their
own caseload, and disregard for the difficulties forced on
unwilling participants to mandatory arbitration.'37  In a
subsequent Montana Supreme Court decision, Justice
Nelson opined that the case law dealing with arbitration
compels the conclusion that large corporations have
effectively privatized a segment of the civil justice system
by including mandatory binding arbitration clauses in
standard form contracts, noting the "horror stories of
corporate abuse of ordinary citizens and small business
people."38
V. APPROPRIATE JUDICIAL USES OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
The chief values of unconscionability are its flexibility
and adaptability to a variety of situations. There are good
and important reasons that it has remained largely
undefined in the case law and in various statutes, left
133. Richard C. Reuben, Western Showdown: Two Montana Judges Buck the
U.S. Supreme Court, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 16.
134. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont. 1994).
135. See id. at 939-40.
136. Id. at 940.
137. See id.
138. Moss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 14 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J.,
concurring), cert denied, 538 U.S. 956 (2003).
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instead to be given content by the workings of judicial
intelligence in response to specific cases as they arise. What
must be avoided under Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act and the rule of Doctor's Associates are arbitration-
specific applications of unconscionability doctrine. Since
some of the failures described above in Section III of this
article are fairly egregious, some of the suggestions made
here are fairly obvious. First, judges should be careful to
articulate the general principles which animate the
doctrine of unconscionability, including one-sidedness,
oppression, unfairness, and harshness, and to identify
general features of unconscionable contracts, such as
hidden terms, ambiguous terms, unequal bargaining power,
and so on. In holding an arbitration agreement
unconscionable, judges must demonstrate how the
agreement exemplifies these general characteristics and
features of unconscionable contracts. Second, conclusions
that a particular arbitration agreement or provision is
unconscionable should be assessed against other decisions
in the jurisdiction. The holdings that forum selection
clauses in arbitration agreements are unconscionable, for
example, cannot stand in comparison to holdings in other
contract cases which universally reach the opposite
conclusion. Such decisions must simply be avoided as
contrary to the Federal Arbitration Act's prescription in
Section 2. Third, it may often be possible to hold an
arbitration agreement unconscionable without creating an
arbitration-specific rule which violates Section 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act. For example, many of the decisions
discussed in Section III of this article dealing with forum
selection clauses in arbitration agreements involved
multiple findings of unconscionability. In other words, it
was unnecessary to assert the preemptable arbitration-
specific ground in order to reach the result. Several other
unconscionable features of the arbitration agreement would
have justified the holding, avoiding the creation of invalid
bases for a finding of unconscionability.
CONCLUSION
There has been a resurgence in the use of the doctrine
of unconscionability over the years as the use of arbitration
has increased. Despite legislative pronouncements and the
strong national policy favoring arbitration, evidence points
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to continuing judicial hostility to arbitration. The expansion
of unconscionability doctrine, through which judges avoid
enforcing arbitration agreements, is, in many instances,
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. Uncon-
scionability as it is used with regard to any contract may
invalidate an arbitration agreement under Section 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act. However, where courts find
agreements regarding costs, forum selection, punitive
damages, and confidentiality unconscionable only in the
context of arbitration, they exceed the permissible scope of
Section 2 and are subject to preemption. Restrained judicial
application of unconscionability doctrine will avoid
preemption problems while permitting judges to invalidate
arbitration agreements in appropriate cases.

